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1.

(last cable)
entire text -

2. summary. rwandan fonmin ngulinzira told tanzanian president mwinyi that
the gor has gone as far as it can and it's up to the observers to lean on the
rpf. he assured the tanzanians that the gor stands behind the offer it made

mpungwe - 2

at arusha III. mwinyi is arranging a meeting with rpf leader kanyarawengwe in
dar es salaam this weekend to discuss this.
rpf negotiator tito remarked
confidentially to tanzanian delegate at addis jpmc meeting that the rp£ can
accept the government's current offer as its bottom line, but would naturally
like to get more.
the tanzanians think nmog commander opaleye is being
unreasonable about both the need for more personnel and the per diem issue,
and intend to raise this with oau secgen salim. tanzanian mfa africa director
mpungwe is still trying to manuever fonmin diria out of the chair.man's seat,
but has low expectations of success. end summary.
3.
following his return from addis ababa, tanzanian mfa director for africa
and the middle east arne mpungwe (strictly protect) met with poloff to discuss
the arusha IV round. mpungwe said that foreign minister ngulinzira's visit on
september 30 had been to relay two messages from president habyarimana:
the
gor stands behind the offer it made at arusha III, but that this is as far as
it can go. It is now up the the observers to press the rpf to accept the
government's offer.
Mpungwe thought that Ngulinzira seemed sincere, but there
is probably some give in the government's position, though not much.
4.
mpungwe added that president mwinyi had decided to ask rpf leader
kanyarawengwe to visit dar es salaam before the next round opens.
He expects
President Mwinyi will relay the GoR position in his usual low-key manner and
ask that the rpf consider it seriously. Also, RPF negotiator rudasingwe is in
town to meet with the MFA.
5.
speaking of the addis jpmc meeting, mpungwe noted that the rpf's antics
had been amusing but not helpful. The Tanzanians had brought BG Christopher
Gimonge, their director of Military Intelligence, to discuss military issues.
They were disappointed with the RPF's failure to bring any military advisors
to the session.
They are also a bit upset with Nigerian General Opaleye for
his demands for more men and rather over-generous per diem.
Mpungwe said he
agreed completely with the U.S. observer's remarks about the OAU pricing
itself out of the peacekeeping business.
Mpungwe plans to see OAU SecGen
Salim Salim in Gabarone around October 15, when the OAU Ad Hoc committee on
Aapartheid meets, and raise Opaleye's requests with him if they are not
resolved beforehand.
6.
but, mpungwe said, the most interesting thing which occurred at addis was
that after the formal jpmc session mpungwe had a private tete-a-tete with rpf
negotiator tito
-----mpungwe states that tito assured him the rpf would,
as its bottom line, accept the gor's offer pretty much as it stands.
polo££

mpungwe - 3

relayed
the substance of ambassador carson's meeting with rpf chairman
kanyarawengwe and said this seemed to corroborate what he heard in addis, but
we agreed that the rpf's extreme distrust of president habyarimana and its
feeling that their security can only be assured by stripping the president of
most of his power remain serious obstacles.
7.
And in our continuing comedy subplot, i.e., the effort to find another
facilitator to replace Diria, Mpungwe says he is still working on it, but it's
getting convoluted.
He thinks he has enlisted Chief Secretary Paul Rupia in
an effort to persuade President Mwinyi that his
foreign
minister
is
desparately needed to uphold Tanzanian interests at the UNGA. Or in South
Africa. Or China .... As a fallback he has enlisted a wise old mzee, whom he
believes Diria will actually respect, to try to talk some sense to the
minister about keeping his mouth shut, not getting into arguments with the
parties, and letting the Rwandans do the negotiating.
8.
comment:
all in all, we think have grounds for confidence that the two
sides may make more substantial progress in Arusha IV, provided the RPF can be
persuaded to desist in its posturing and both parties can focus on negotiating
a settlement as opposed to scoring points off each other.
Mpungwe says that
despite their behavior at Addis both sides assured him at the end that they
will come to Arusha prepared for serious discussions. We can only hope it's
true.
As for the effort to depose everyone's favorite facilitator, we think
Rupia is much too smart and much too happy in his current job to risk trying
to cross the President's best after-mosque schmoozing buddy. Nor do we think
efforts to train him are going to have much success; Diria's not ineducable,
but he is very dense.
ewing##

Arusha IV:

First Day

The parties trickled into Arusha during the day on October 5, with the RPF
delegation delayed in Uganda by problems with their travel documents (if true,
a point to raise with the Ugandans) . The mood was of anticipation mixed with
concern. The Tanzanians feels that the GoR really cannot give much more
ground than they already have, and they suspect that the RPF will make one
more stab with its Presidential Council idea and set back the talks before
they get started.
President Mwinyi saw Chairman Kanyarengwe this morning in
Dar es Salaam and urged that the RPF be flexible.
The plan for the evening of the 5th is, if the RPF arrives, to have a brief
session to confirm the areas of agreement from the last round, discuss the
agenda for the coming round, and then get to the substance October 6.
Mbapila, making the rounds of the observers, asked for suggestions.
Poloff
emphasized the need to focus the talks on specifics. Everyone seemed to agree
on what the problems were in general terms, but the solutions to those
problems had to be formulated in terms of concrete arrangements. The RPF
needed to get clarifications of how exactly the government's proposal would
work;
the GoR, in its turn, had to be able to provide the concrete details
that would indicate whether its proposals really
addressed
the
RPF's
concerns.
Mbapila bemoaned the propensity of the francophone Africans to
phrase their propositions in vague statements of sweeping principles, saying
"we have a lot of problems with that at the OAU." But there may be more to
this than a tendency towards generalizations.
Clearly the two parties are
speaking in a kind of code; the general term "the state powers" may not have
the same meaning for both. Looking at how the RPF reacted to the phrase,
"legal acts of the president" in the GoR's proposal (the RPF suspected a trap
-- what about illegal acts or extralegal acts?) it is possible that what
really concerns the RPF is the President's ability to just pick up a
telephone,
issue
orders,
and
make things happen no matter what the
constitution
says.

Second Day at Arusha IV (October 6)

1. Summary. The Government presented the details of its proposals for a
transitional reg~e in the morning plenary. These involved transfer much of
the President's powers to a more powerful Prime Minister, while leaving the
President a substantial role in the promulgation of decrees and legislation,
in convening the Cabinet, and in submitting legislation to the National
Assembly.
In the afternoon, the RPF responded with a more detailed exposition
of their ideas for a National Presidential Council, with three RPF members,
and one from each of the other coalition parties (including the President as
the MRND member) . In the evening, GoR Fonmin Ngulinzira was just getting
warmed up to his rebuttal when the power failed, forcing an early adjournment
for the day.
2. The second day got off to a slow start, with the facilitator spending much
of the morning in lengthy consultations with the two sides. The Tanzanians
persuaded both parties to forego long (and possibly contentious opening
statements) and try instead to pick up directly where they left off.
Rwandan
Foreign ~nister Ngulinzira opened the plenary with a rather long set of
"introductory remarks," to which the RPF's Bizimungu made a mercifully brief
reply.
Tanzanian MFA Principal Secretary Mbapila urged the GoR to move
directly to discussion of power-sharing in the Executive, picking up from the
end of the last session.
3.
Thus prompted, Ngulinzira laid out the following details, amplifying the
government's Arusha III proposal:
-- The President,
following powers:
Naming the Prime
Appointing
Minister;

the

in

his

capacity

~nister

other

as

Head

of

State,

would

exercise

the

and receiving his resignation;

members

of

the

Government

proposed

-- Accrediting Ambassadors and Envoys, who would be appointed by
Minister, and receiving the accreditations of foreign ambassadors;

by the Prime

the

Pr~e

Formally representing the Republic in its relations with the outside world;
Sanctioning and Promulgating laws passed by the National Assembly within 15
days after their constitutionality has been approved by the Constitutional
Court;
In urgent situations, the Government may
sanctioned and promulgated by the Head of State;

make

decrees

which are then

-- The Head of State may veto laws proposed by the National Assembly and
return them to the assembly for review within 15 days of his veto. If the
Assembly passes the law again, and it is again pronounced constitutional, then
the President must sanction and promulgate the law.
Exercising the right of pardon;
Appointing magistrates following
Supreme Council of the Legislature.

the

advice of the Supreme Court and the

Some of the powers of the President would be exclusive; other actions may not
be taken unless on advice of the Cabinet and the Bureau of the National
Assembly, such as:
Dissolving the Assembly;
Submitting draft laws or any issue to a referendum;
Declaring war or promulgating amnesties.
4. Ngulinzira concluded that the Government felt the prerogatives of the Head
of State could not really be shared but that his powers could be limited; he
suggested that further limits were possible.
On relations between
the
President and the Government (i.e., the Cabinet), Ngulinzira proposed the
following powers for the Prime Minister of the Broad-based Transitional
Government (BBTG) :
-- chairing cabinet meetings (currently, the President does) .
However, the
President
could convene and chair cabinet meetings whenever the issues
concerned required the approval of the cabinet or the national assembly for
action;
determining
in the cabinet;

national

policies in consultation with the parties represented

presenting the government's program to the
the members of the cabinet;

national

assembly,

as

well

as

directing all government activities and establishing the agenda for cabinet
meetings which he chairs, and so informing the President;
-- fixing the powers and authorities of the Ministers and the secretaries of
state, and determining the nature and competencies of the services under their
authority;
-- appointing civilian and military officials. In particular cases determined
by law where such appointments remained the prerogative of the president, the
president would make such appointments upon the recommendation of the Prime
Minister as agreed to by the Cabinet;
countersigning
the President;

laws

adopted

by

the national assembly for promulgation by

--executing the laws and regulations. The Prime Minister's
decided on by the consensus of the Cabinet.

decrees

would

be

5.

The BBTG would have the following powers:

en~uring
the ~plementation
administration and the ar.my;

of

the laws, and taking control of the civil

-- negotiating and concluding treaties and agreements with foreign countries,
such agreements to be submitted to the President for ratification. However,
peace treaties, alliances, treaties affecting the borders or soveriegnty of
the nation, or having financial ~plications for the government would not
become effective until approved by the national assembly and promulgated by
the President;
drafting laws for submission to the National Assembly;
In emergencies, drafting decrees for direct promulgation by the President;
adopting
the

decrees submitted by the President or the Prime
of the laws;

~nister

regarding

~plementation

approving appointments to senior civil and military positions;
-- adopting acts relating to the printing of currency; the President would
have the power to print money but only with the concurrence of the Cabinet
(comment: they've been thinking about Zaire);
6. Ngulinzira concluded by saying that the GoR would be glad to consider any
amendments the RPF might wish to make to their proposals, and offered to
provide them as a document of the conference. Chairman Mbapila suggested that
the conference defer the production of papers for the moment and suggested
that the RPF reflect on the proposals and provide their thoughts in the
afternoon plenary.

7.
In the afternoon plenary, Chair.man Mbapila turned the floor over to RPF
delegation head Biz~ungu. He began by referring to Articles 35, 39, and 57
of the current constitution, under which the President exercised power with
the assistance of the government, ensured the functioning and continuity of
state institutions, was the arbiter between state institutions, and the
gaurantor
of
national
unity,
and in which legislative authority was
collectively vested in the President and the National Assembly.
Bizimungu
said that executive powers could be shared either by transferring them to
other institutions, by ensuring collective decision-making, or
by
some
combination
of
these
techniques.
He remarked that the RPF preferred
collective decision-making but would not be "dogmatic" on that point.
But he
insisted
that mechanisms had to be found to ensure that power-sharing
arrangements would be operative during a transition.
8. Biz~ungu then went through the government's proposals, point by point,
claiming either that they were too vague, or simply duplicated provisions of
the current constitution that had already proved incapable of effectively
restraining
the president, as shown by the Prime Minister's letter of
September 22. He emphasized that he was not rejecting the government's offer,
merely
commenting
on it.
Ngulinzira attempted to further clarify the
proposals, stating that their goal was to ensure that the president could not
make decisions alone, that the Cabinet had to be involved. He agreed that
some of the provisions reflected the current constitution but pointed out that
this constitution had created a certain level of power-sharing already.
Bizimungu replied that the RPF did not care to be offered the June 10
constitution. He referred to the Prime Minister's letter of September 22, and
to
the problems cited there with the President refusing to assent to
appointments or decrees offered by the current Cabinet, thus stymying the
government.
Therefore the RPF preferred its National Presidential Council
(NPC), whose seven members (including President Habyarimana) would exercise
power
collectively.
All the current powers of the President would be
exercised, during the transition, by the NPC. Under the RPF proposal, the NPC
would:
--promulgate the laws passed
sanctioned by the Cabinet;

by the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and

--together with the TNA, initiate new legislation;
--become the guarantor of the nation's sovereignty, unity and
of the independence of the judiciary;
--address messages to the nation;

independence

and

--excercise the right of control over the government;
--become the arbiter between the institutions of state;
--assume the powers of appointment granted the president;
--appoint the judiciary;
--command the armed forces;
--declare was and sign amnesties, in accordance with the advice and approval
of the Cabinet and the TNA;
--declare states of seige or emergency, upon approval of the TNA;
--control the printing of currency;
--exercise a suspensive veto over legislation;
The government would be . left with proposing the budget to the NPC, and
drafting presidential decrees for approval and promulgation by the NPC.
Bizimungu finally suggested that because it included the parties as well as
President Habyarimana, it could be called the "Broad-based
Presidential
Council." On that note, the plenary broke for tea.
9.
During the break, the observers met briefly with the facilitators. The
consensus was that while we had more clearly defined the positions of the two
sides little real progress had been made. The government had elaborated its
scheme to subsume Habyarimana in the Cabinet and strengthen the Cabinet and
the Prime Minister; the RPF had replayed its proposal for a Council of
National Reconciliation, repackaged as the NPC. When the plenary reconvened,
Ngulinzira criticized the RPF proposal for needlessly duplicating existing
institutions. He noted that it was not clear where in the hierarchy the
members of the NPC would fit. He pointed out that the Government's proposals
entailed a series of amendments to the current constitution to make the system
work effectively.
Mechanisms would be established to ensure that "the fate of
the nation was not in hands of one man." He pointed out that because the
President would be given only a suspensive veto, he would be unable to do more
than delay any initiative of the Cabinet or the Assembly.
The RPF was
proposing an unweildy new structure that might be a new source of conflicts
and confusion.

10. And at that point
darkness amid caustic
called it a day.

the power failed.
With the plenary plunged into
remarks about "power sharing" in Tanzania, the Chairman

11. Comment: For the moment, the two sides appeared to have entrenched
themselves in their current positions. And the scuttlebutt from the Ugandan
observer is that the RPF is being strongly supported in its NPC idea by the
opposition parties in Kigali, and may be operating on the assumption that if
it holds out long enough, the internal conflicts within the government will
force it to yield, at least to the extent of negotiating on the basis of the
RPF's proposal. The government, on its side, seems to be counting on observer
and regional (i.e., Ugandan) pressure to make the RPF more reasonable.
Although RPF reps have told several observers now that they are willing to
flexible about the GoR's proposal provided it can be amended to meet their
concerns, their presentations of October 6 indicate they intend to fight for
every clause.
ewingti

Draft cable text:
Arusha IV:

October 7

1. Summary. During the morning emboff met over breakfast and coffee
with Amb. Kanyarashoki of the GOR delegation and later with Bizimungu
and Mazimhaka of the RPF. In the plenary that morning, the Government
went still further in amplifying and explaining its proposal, suggesting
that it would effectively check any attempt by the President to exercise
power
unilaterally.
Fonmin Ngulinzira noted that the Constitution
provided an ultimate sanction
impeachment
if the
President
violated the constitution or the peace accord. The RPF, rather than
respond in plenary, accepted the chair's offer for private consultations
with the government, which continued through the evening.
Initial
reports from these indicated that the two sides continued to more
clearly define their concerns and how their proposals would work but
without closing the gaps between their positions. end summary.
2.

At breakfast with dar es salaam polo££ bentley and German observer
Ventslaff on October 7, Rwandan
delegate
Amb.
Kanyaroshoki
indicated that the GOR felt the RPF was demanding executive powers for
itself, going beyond what the Government could offer.
He wondered if
the RPF was fixated on its proposal for a National Presidential Council
(NPC) because they had certain leaders who refused to enter
the
government
as
"mere
ministers."
He thought, however, that the
objections the RPF raised about the President's ability to obstruct the
process or do end runs around the government and the constitution
represented real concerns.
He felt that the government's proposals
addressed these concerns by making it impossible for Habyarimana to act
legally without the consent of the cabinet
or
the
transitional
legislature, and by moving much of his executive authority into the
cabinet.
Asked how the GOR could address the concerns about the
President violating the constitution or reneging on an
agreement,
Kanyaroshoki said that if the President did so he could be impeached.
Amb.

4.
Later that morning, RPF negotiators Bizimungu and Maz±rnhaka detailed
their problems with the GOR proposal. The RPF felt that the GOR offer
was simply a repackaging of the current constitution and really did
little to prevent the President from abusing his powers or reneging on
the peace agreement.
They thought that the President would continue to
obstruct and frustrate the process, even to the extent of continuing the
killings which they claimed were still going on in Kibuye. They feared
that the President, whatever the government agreed to, would use terror
tactics and his control of groups like the MRND youth to abort the
transition.
Without mentioning what
Kanyaroshoki
had
said
about
impeaching the President (God alone knows how that will play in Kigali),
poloff suggested that the RPF should raise these concerns with the GOR
negotiators, and should try to find out how far the GOR was willing to go
to address them.
5.
At the morning plenary, with Tanzanian MFA principal Secretary
Mbapila in the chair, Rwandan Fonmin Ngulinzira offered further details
on how power would be transferred from the President to the government
(i.e., the Cabinet) and would be exercised through the transition.
He
made clear that the GOR envisioned constitutional amendments that would
leave to Habyarimana the honor of approving those decisions and actions
and appointments that the Cabinet or the legislature wanted approved.
The suspensive veto was exactly that
a means by which Habyarimana
could suspend action and force a reconsideration, but could not block
action.
Finally, he noted that
if
the
President
violated
the
constitution or the ter.ms of the peace agreement, if he sought to block
implementation of government policies by refusing to decrees where the
constitution required that he do so, the impeachment process offered a
remedy.
6. The RPF, somewhat surprised by Ngulinzira's broaching of the threat
of impeachment as a control on President Habyarimana's behavior, accepted
the offer of Chair.man Mbapila to consult privately with
the
GOR
delegation to seek further clarification. The plenary then adjourned.
7.
The private consultations between the GOR and RPF delegations
continued through the evening of October 7. Early reports suggested that
they were continuing to define and amplify their positions and concerns
but that neither side showed much signs of movement.

October 9
Fomin Diria has had to take a quick trip to Zanzibar· for a party
meeting.
Rawson urged him to let someone else chair the plenary so that
observers could at least get a sense of where closed-door discussions
were leading and could encourage negotiating parties to speed their
efforts. The idea of an afternoon plenary was accepted,but it turned
into a late evening meeting
At dinner, Tanzanian Ambassador Mpungwe told Rawson that they, as
facilitator, had stopped the speech-making, had told the Government that
there should be no documents presented until there was basic agreement on
substance of agreement and had encouraged
direct
contact
between
parties.
Having witnessed the desire on one party or another to seek
support for their case from observers, the faciltator had told them to
them to work out their own solutions.
This was the origin of Prin.
Secretary Mbapila's caution to observers to let negotiators alone in this
"delicate stage of negotiations."
October 10
Fomin Ngulinzira told Rawson that it appeared that negotiators were at
an impasse. The government had offered a complete schema for allocation
of respective power critical to the transition process. But the RPF was
requiring a complete devloution of all presidential
power
leaving
Habyarimana only with a ceremonial role. This was not acceptable back in
Kigali. Rawson told Fomin that plenary ought to meet to hear where
things stood.
When plenary met in AM, Fomin on behalf of negotiators went down list
of items (12) on which there was convergence, items (5) on which there
was partial convergence and items (10) on which there was disagreement.
He prefaced his remarks by noting that the main issue was the role of the
president in decision making. RPF seemed to want total transfer of power
to Government.
Government proposal was based on a semi-presidential
system, political efficacy and separation of powers.
Two principles
guide their negotiating posture:
negotiations
must
go
on,
and,
negotiations should produce a balancing out of powers among government
institutions. It has been agreed that the President will be involved
at least in a nominating of officilaizing role in minting of money,
giving pardon, designatingnational
orders
ofmerit,
signingtreaties,
receiving oaths.
Areas of divergence include role of President as
guarantor of national sovereignty and judicial independence, delivering
messages to the nation, representing the state in relations with other
states, declaration of war or making peace, implementation of laws, being
chief of armed forces, proclamation of emergency and dissolution of
National Assembly.
Commissioner Mazimhaka responded for RPF. RPF was trying to improve
on proposal the government presented. They had no intention to exclude
any
party or any person from contributing to the success of the
transition. They wanted to insure that no party or person could block
the transition process.
Mechanisms cf government should be efficient,
transparent and broad-based.
They wanted to avoid pitfalls of too
extensive consultation with possibilities of delaying legislation or
tabling of counter legislation which could have a disastrous effect on
impetus toward transition.
The head of state may have perogatives, but
he should share his powers with other forces in the executive.
The
ability of the President to challenge cabinet is a power. They sought

from the government side a clearer definition of how they distinguished
perogatives and powers.
At the meeting's end, Fomin Ngulinzira said
government was attracted by RPF idea of President exercising power in
cabinet and of looking again at other perogatives to make sure they were
carefully defined.
During a break in plenary, Rawson told Fomin Ngulinzira and Fomin
Diria that there appeared to be lot of progress and quite a few things
parties could push forward toward convergence
even
if
areas
of
disagreement were left in abeyance. He recommended that the parties meet
again in head-to-head negotiation, while the secretariat tabulated for
the record the areas on which they had agreed. On resumption of the
plenary, this was given as the order of procedure.
Monday, October 12.
Closed door discussions continued Saturday afternoon and
Sunday.
Parties
reported they were making progress on several issues.
In
comments to all parties, Rawson reiterated the theme that negotiated
positions must deal with RPF concerns but will be meaningless unless they
also satisfy the major political forces in Rwanda.
Sunday afternoon's
plenary was pushed back to Monday morning.
At the beginning of that
session, Amb. Mpungwe announced that there would be
no
technical
discussion
of military integration at the end of this negotiating
session. Then, Commissioner Bizimungu took the floor to brief observers
on behalf of both delegations.
They had decided that the current
president would remain in place until elections at the end of the interim
period.
The
President
should
exercise
certain
perogatives
and
participate in decision making but executive power would be exercised
collectively in the Council of Ministers.
The Prime Minister would
direct the actions of government
but the President could add items to
the government agenda and participate in council if he wished--in such a
case, he would preside over Council.
The President would have no veto power and would have to sign decrees
and laws within ten days of their certification by the Consititional
Court.
Presidential acts are countersigned as appropriate by the prime
miniter and the relevant minister.
The President can name the Prime
Minister and other ministers, name ambassadors, represent Rwanda abroad,
sign pardons, orders to mint money, national awards, and treaties.
The
right to propose laws goes to the Council of Ministers and the national
Assembly.
Nomination of civil servants will depend on their rank.
Nomination of military officers will be discussed in the integration
negotiations.
Declarations of a state of emergency, of war
or of
armistice must betaken in the Council of Ministers and approved by the
National Assembly.
Areas yet to be resolved regarded who is guarantor of national unity
and judicial independence, who gets to address the nation, who is chief
of ar.med forces, who has the power to dissolve the national assembly,
what it the for.mula ofthe oath of office although it is agreed that it
will be sworn before the president, what is the modality to determine the
program of the government and what happens when the Presidency is vacated.
Tuesday, October 13
Fomin Diria announced that he had to leave for OAU Ad Hoc Summit on
South Africa; Ambassador Fall would temporarily chair. Diria handed out
a statement from the chair prolonging the political negotiations beyond
October 10 and urging respect of the ceasefire, something we had been
after him to do since last week.
OAU Assistant Sec Gen Maparanga
reported that all six NMOG . contingents were in Kigali and should be
deployed to the front by the week-end.
There would be no emergency
meeting of the JPMC, but one might be called at the snd of this
negotiating session.

Fomin Ngulinzira presented the results of negotiations.
The two
parties had decided that the preident would sanction and promulgate laws
without right of veto within tens days after their constitutionality was
certified. The Council of Ministers would decided on declarations of war
and
peace which would be authorized by the National Assembly but
declaration made by the President.
The President and Pr~e Minister
would address to the nation messages whose contents had been apporved in
Ministerial Council. There had been agreement on the formula for oaths.
The
Government
in
Council
of Ministers would safeguard national
sovereignty, assure the national defense and organize the armed forces.
The Pr~e Minister would declare national emergencies.
The parties had not yet agreed on issues regarding independence of the
judiciary, especially who names judges; on whether the President would be
Commander-in-Chief; on who signs nominating papers to civilian positions;
on what to do in case of Presidential vacancy; on how the National
Assembly
is
dissolved;
on the choice of Pr~e Minister, and on
establishing the national program
After the plenary, on a friendly visit the local produce market,
Rawson raised with Ugandan Vice-Foreign Minister Didi, his concern that
government had given away significant presidential powers in the last
negotiating session, especially his emergency powers and that RPF ought
to concede the Commander-in-Chief title if they wanted Habyarimana to be
brought
into
the process rather than alienated from it.
Such a
concession would win them a lot of manoevering room on other issues.
The
Minister said he would try to talk to the "boys" about it.
Wednesday, October 14
In conversation over a goat chew, Vice-Minister Didi told Amb. Fall
that Rawson's arguments had convinced h~ that Habyar~ana should retain
the Commander-in-Chief title; he was glad that the RPF had agreed to
leave that perogative to the President.
(The unspoken ~port was that
Didi had arrange RPF's acquiescence.)
Later
that afternoon, Fomin Ngulinzira told Rawson that issues
relating to presidential power had all been decided.
The Council of
Ministers meeting in Kigali had endorsed everything the negotiators had
decided. MRND Ministers were part of that consensus.
Questions of how
to replace the CND, how to elect or nominate the inter~ National
Assembly, and how to ensure independence to the judiciary remained to be
discussed.
He thought they might agree to reinstitute the Supreme Court
and showed Rawson a draft proposal which jurists from both sides had
worked out together.
Rawson
congratulated
the
Foreign
Minister
on
his successful
negotiations and suggested the possibility of an enlarged
assembly
incorporating rather than replacing the CND as one possible approach to
the legislative problem.
In a long conversation with UNDP ResRep Ndaw, Rawson stressed the
importance of international supervision of the fragile, unstable process
of seeking peace and democracy in Rwanda.
He also mentioned
the
importance that international bodies and neighboring counties make all
necesary arrangements for compiance with the Dar es Salaam agreement on
refugees since peace might be soon at hand and Rwanda will be prepared to
carry out its side of the bargain.
Rawson made the same points later
with OAU Sec Gen Mapuranga.
Thursday, October 15
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negotiations with Rawson. Rudasingwa said the RPF were satisfied with
discussions on Presidential powers which had been the most critical area
for them. He felt that their particular concerns had been adequately
covered.
There should be no major problems on judiciary or the National
Assembly. Rudasingwa noted RPF's concern to bring refugees back on to
the political agenda at some point.
Rawson asked whatever happened to the idea of having local elections
so as to have local officials whom the people could really trust, an idea
Kagame had raised in Kampala.
Rudasingwa said that local officials
initially would be appointed but RPF favored electing them as soon as
practicable.
Rawson wondered to what extent the RPF wanted to push an
"assainisement administrative."
Rudasingwa said RPF
did
not
want
wholesale changes, only changes in essential ministries or among those
local officials who were not adequately preforming their duties.
Rawson
noted. the trade off between rapid structural change which brought
instability with attendant administrative inefficiencies and maintenance
of
a
status quo in existing structures and office holders which
discouraged hopes for effective change.
He noted the importance of a
continual international presence guaranteeing the interim process to keep
unstable interim political conditions from degenerating into political
violence, if not civil war or genocide.
In plenary session at 7pm, Commissioner Bizimungu briefed observers on
negotiating progress. Items regarding executive power had been decided,
except for the question of presidential vacancy and who dissolves the
National Assembly which had been rewerved to another time.
Bizimungu
confir.med the the president would be Commander-in-Chief and that the
Supreme Court would be recreated, thus finessing the question as to who
is guardian of judicial independence and appoints judges. Decidions in
government would be by consensus but after a second reading would be by
wo-thirds
majority,
except for questions of defense, security and
amending the peace accord--all of which require consensus.
Executive
powers breakdown as follows:
The President:
--Remains commander-in-chief of the ar.med forces;
--Represents the state in foreign relations
war or ar.mistices, and receives ambassadors;

signs treaties, declares

--Sanctions and promulgates laws (but without a veto) within
their constituitonal certification;

ten

days

of

--Signs nominations of Chancellier de l'Ordre National, Governor of the
Central bank, his own Director of Cabinet and personal secretary and
counsellors, Rector of the University, Ambassadors, Secretaries-General,
Directors of Cabinet, Ministerial Councellors;
--Signs pardons and orders to print money;
--Can add his concerns to the Council
chair meetings as desired;

of

Minister's

agenda,

attend

and

--May address to the nation a message whose contents have been approved
by the Council of Ministers.

The Prime

~nister

--Convokes, chairs and directs the work of the
elaborates the program of the government;

Council

of

Ministers

and

--Chooses members of the government and sets their responsibilities;
--Signs nominations of Vice Rector of the University, his counsellors,
prefets, sous-prefets,
Bourgemestres,
ministerial
directors-general,
directors of public enterprises, administrators of mixed companies;
--Countersigns laws and decrees;
--Procla~s

a state of emergency;

--May address to the nation a message whose contents have been approved
by the Council of ~nisters.
The Government:
--Determines national policy and assures its implementation;
--Issues legal decrees when the national assembly is not in session;
--Names persons to civil service positions;
--Safeguards the nation and guarantees its sovereignty.

Yet to be examined are powers of the Vice-Pr~e ~nister, the larger
outline
of
the
interim government program, means of forming the
government and specifics about the specialized commissions.
All aspects
of the National Assembly of Transition have to be considered. The
negotiators projected that they would have concluded their negotiations
and be ready for signature of a protocol by Thursday the 22nd of
October. After the meeting, Fomin Ngulinzira told observers that they
hoped to have the regular monthly meeting of the JPMC in Arusha on
October 22 and 23 so as to save time and money since so many of the
participants were already here.

October 20-21
The
two
parties remained closeted with each other, essentially
deadlocked during this period over.the issue of the transitional national
assembly and the actual arrangements for distributing portfolios within
the transtional cabinet. On October 20 the government team referred the
issue back to Kigali for further instructions; on the 21st, Ambassador
Kanyarushoke told Rawson that the Government had decided on a formula for
classifying
ministries
into three categories:
national soveriegnty
(defense, foreign affairs, internal affairs); economics and development
(transportation and communications, public works, finance, et al); social
services (education, health, et al) .
The RPF would be guaranteed at
least one ministry in the first category (either defense or interior),
and one or two ministries in the others. No political party would have
more than two ministries in ·any one category. The GOR felt that this
plan should be incorporated into the peace agreement but that the actual
distribution of portfolios should await the formation of the transitional
government and be handled by the prime minister.
The GOR also insisted
that the peace agreement confirm the current prime minister (nsengyaremwe
(?)) in his office.
In the late evening of the 21st RPF negotiator Theogen Rudasingwa told
Bentley and AF/RA military advisor Marley that this formula for cabinet
power sharing was acceptable to the RPF. But they insisted that they had
to agree on which party would get which ministry in advance and that this
agreement be incorporated into the peace agreement.
They also objected
to the peace agreement being use to confirm the current P.M. in his
office; they felt that in principle the peace agreement should provide
for parties to get portfolios but that individuals should not be named.
We had the feeling that Rudasingwa was really saying that the political
opposition and perhaps elements within his own party were not entirely
happy with the P.M. and were seeking an opportunity to depose him.
Throughout the two days, in casual contacts with both the government
and RPF team members, Rawson and other observers urged the two parties to
seek ways around the impasse on the national assembly.
Foreign Minister
Ngulinzira, speaking to US Rep Rawson the morning of the 21st, described
he government's current offer as a bicameral house, with the current CND
retained as the lower house to deal with administrative law, while an
appointed upper house would be created that would have the right to
review and approve of legislation from the CND, and also would handle
matters relating to the constitution and the peace agreement.
The RPF
felt that the government was attempting to retain the CND in its current
form and that this was an unacceptable step back from its earlier

commitment to a transtional national assembly.
Xhey felt that the
government's
argument that it would be undemocratic to replace an
"elected" assembly with an appointed body did not wash; Rudasingwa noted
(and US Reps had to agree) that 'l.he m1rrent CND, .as a ·single-party
assembly whose candidates had faced .no political competition and had been
selected by the MRND hierarchy, was hardly a democratic or representative
body in the way those terms are commonly understood. However, Rep Rawson
also observed that the GOR offer was a reasonable way to try to
accomodate both the RPF's concerns as well as MRND requirements in a
transitional mechanism.
During their late sitting with Rudasingwa, Bentley and Marley also
introduced the topics of military integration and the need to start
thinking about the long-term, post-transitional arrangements.
Marley
provided Rudasingwa with copies of the Angolan and Mozambican agreements
on military integration, together with an analysis by USLO Luanda of some
of the problems and pitfalls that had been encountered in implementing
the Angolan agreement.
Bentley remarked that it was also time for the
Rwandan leaders on both sides to start thinking about post-transition
arrangements.
As long as Rwandans continued to identify themselves by
enthnicity the real danger of the Tutsi becoming an isolated permanent
minority
remained.
Arrangements
had
to be developed that would
incorporate the Tutsis into a broad, moderate center that would also
embrace a majority of Hutus, thus isolating ethnic supremacists on the
fringes. The politics had to be designed to work in such a way as to
penalize rather than reward appeals to ethnicity; the situation to avoid
was the Sri Lankan disaster, where a system of majoritarian democracy
made ethnic accommodation impossible because any Sinhalese party that
tried to reach an agreement with Tamils would be accused by the other
Sinhalese parties of selling out.
Finally, Rudasingwa said that if agreement could not be finalized at
this session, then perhaps it was time for a face-to-face meeting between
President Habyarimana and RPF Chairman Kanyarengwe. This might be the
only way to resolve the outstanding issues in a manner that would
definitively commit both parties. US Reps' reaction to this (not shared
with Rudasingwa) was that the RPF may be stalling on the negotiations in
order to try to force such a meeting.
Thursday, October 22
At breakfast on the 22nd RPF negotiators told the US Reps that they
had responded to the governments proposals regarding distribution of
government portfolios and the government would this morning meet with
them to go over the issue. It might be that they would be able to reach
agreement on cabinet portfolios and to "put that in their pocket." In
addition to cabinet portfolios, remaining items of business on power
sharing
included agreement on how the peace accord fits into the

constitution and agreement on how the national assembly is set up and how
it is to operate.
Rawson said he hoped the negotiators could move
forward today; there were some practical proposals out on the table that
could serve as useful ways of meeting each side's concerns. Rudasingwa
said that there might be some surprises by the end of the day.
Later Rawson met privately with Amb. Kanyarushoki. Kanyarushoki said
the RPF wanted to designate portfolios right now, but the government was
concerned about the effect on ministerial authority in this time of
instability if, two months before the interim arrangements were set up,
certain ministers were known to be on the way out..
Rawson suggested
that they agree on modalities of choice and commit themselves to dividing
portfolios after the talks on military integration but before the final
accord is signed. Kanyarushoki said that looked like a useful compor.mise.
Rawson also met with Commissioner Bizimungu. When Rawson hoped that
there might be break-throughs today on pending issues, Bizimungu said one
should not expect to end up things today. Rawson said he was not talking
about final wrap up but about moving forward on practical ideas that
could bridge current differences.
Bizimungu said we would have to wait
and see what the gover.ment's response was on ministerial portfolios.
Bentley and Rawson joined in an after dinner conversation between RPF
Mazimphaka and Ugandan Vice-Minister Didi.
They tried to stress the
importance ofcoming up with a formula that co-opted the MRND and its
members in the CND into the peace process rather than left them outside
where they might try to undermine it. Mazimpaka said that sounded like
black mail.
Rawson and Bentley pointed out that an elected body, even if
elected within a one-party system could not be dismissed out of hand; it
had a right to ask why it should be replaced by the arbitrary porcess of
nomination. The Minister reiterated his idea of keeping the CND in place
but neutralizing their impact with appointed members. Mazimpaka saw this
as an expensive and clumsy arrangement.
After Mazimmpaka left for talks with the other side,
Friday, October 23
On the way to breakfast, Fomin Ngulinzira asked if we could convince the
RPF to agree on modalities for dividing up government portfolios now and
to specifically assign portfolios just before the peace agreement was to
be signed.
Rawson noted that that might depend on what the government
was asking as a solution to the remaining problem--the InterLm National
Assembly.
The Minister said they were not really ready to discuss that
except to perhpas explore some possible scenarios.
the government was
now thinking of proposing a nominated National Assembly in which all
parties and interest groups were represented, one seat or two for smaller

groups and several seats for larger parties. Rawson asked if they had
given up on the idea of indirect elections and popular representation.
The Minister reported that the Council of Ministers was meeting today to
discuss that issue. He would not be in a position to ·make a concrete
offer until after he had talked with his Prime Minister. Following her
call to Kigali, Carol Fuller confirmed that in the President's meeting
with parties yesterday, those present asked that if the CND was not to be
replace by elections that they be named to the new Assembly.
the council
of Ministers was discussing the issue.
Saturday, October 24
After breakfast, Andrew Rwigamba briefed Rawson and Bentley on thr RPF
position.
They wanted a definitive distribution of porfolios
made
throughnegotioations in Arusha at this round. They did not believe they
could Simply entrust this to the Prime Minister's choosing.
However, it
might be possible to wait until after the military negotiations as long
as ministerial allotments were clearly ensribed in a claendar of things
that had to be done prior to thesigning of the peace agreement. On the
legislature, they had never felt that elections were possible at this
time.
Now the govt. had finally tabled the idea of an enlarged CND. THe
RPF felt that political forces should be equally represented in the
Assembly.
If you kept the current CND that meant a house of 240 people.
Bentley told Rwigamba of the New Hampshire House of 400 plus legislatures
for 800,000 people. Rwigamba was also aware of thr MRD and PL statements
denoucing the Fomin's position and wonderedwhom he rerpesented.
Rawson
pointed out that parties in a multi-party system could hold opinions
different form that of their members in coalition government.
It was
clear that the Fomin still represented the Rwandan government and was
taking instruction from its Prime Minister. In any case, Rawson argued,
the international setting of these negotiations was guarantee that what
was offered here and accepted here would endure regardless of political
waves back in Kigali.
He urged the RPF to understand that the Minister
spoke authoritatively for the government and to work with h~ to get over
the remaining obstacles to an agreement. Rawson asked Rwigamba if the
RPF was really interested in reaching an agreement this round or if they
preferred to come back after a period of reflection to deal with these
issues. Rwigamba said that the RPF had come here to negotiate and wanted
to leave with a signed protocol. Bentley pointed out that without that,
by the time they came back to the table, the RPF might lose a lot of what
they had worked so hard to get.
That evening Fomin Nuglinzira gave a summary at plenary session of
what had been decided betimes. This included agreement on the economic
porgramforthe
government,
agreement
on
professional standards for
national service, agreement on the specialized institutions and on how
they fit in the intsitutional structure. The Government had also agreed
to drop the insistence that the prime Minister be returned to office.
It
had been agreed that the new Prime Minister will be chosen from some
party other than the President's. There was basic agreement on how the
cabinetshould be distributed but a difference as to when portfolios
whould actually be assigned to political forces.
The Fomin then explained the government's position on the National
Assembly.
It had wanted an assembly that was representative of the

People's wishes and had proposed direct elections in.· three months, then
indirect elections, electoral college, consitutent assembly, a nominated
second house with special powers and finally an expanded CND.
The
government was still looking for a compromise which RPF would accept.
Patrick Maz~paka spoke for·· the RPF. Their idea on the government had
been to have RPF share some of MRND portfolios.
The government's
breakdown of porfolio categories coincidentally matched their earlie;
allocation.
Now it was a matter of timing when the allocation should be
made. On the National Assembly, the RPF had not expected to ever
againdiscuss
theCND
after
having
accepted inthe first round the
government's proposal of a national assembly of transition.
The RPF was
convinced that in the current political environment with the exclusion of
an Lmportant part of the potential electorate and the security situation
an e1ectoral process was not possible. He a1so exp1ained the prob1ems
with a nominated second house, nor were they happy about one house
dominated by one party.
They were still looking for ways to set up the
National Assembly and he said, "We will find them."
Tuesday, October 27
At breakfast, observers were informed that the promised plenary that
evening was to be instead an acceptance ana signing of the JPMC reports.
Rawson told Fomin Nuglinzira that this was not acceptable.
Observers
needed
to
be
officially informed of what progress there was in
negotiations, even if there was not any. Rawson called Amb. Mpungwe over
tothe table and secured the facilitator's agreement that the evening
session would include a report on negotiations.
An hour and a half late, the plenary began with Fomin Ngulinzira again
giving the summary. Agreement had been reached on the presidential oath,
on ~unities for the President and other high officials, on attaching
presidential Offices of Information and Tourism to theiR respective
ministries, and on the organization of judicial power. The Fomin then
went into a long explanation of duties and powers of the Supreme Court as
well as qualifications and means of nominating its officers. He promised
that negotiations would resume on cabinet portfolios and on the National
Assembly tomorrow.
Commissioner BizLmungu offered three observations:
That they had
indeed been cleaning up some periferal matters in a spirit of frankness
and friendship; that they would await any government proposals
on
government portfolios or the National Assembly but if there were no
forwardmovement on these issues, the RPF porposed a pause and a third
round which would include these element plus refugee questions; and that
given Habyrimana's agreement to meet with Kanyarengwe, that the two
leaders chair this next round so as to help draw together these seemingly
intractable issues.
Fomin Nuglinzira did not think the matters recently negotiated to be
periferal but central to the functioning of a new institution they had
agred on--the Supreme Court. He noted that the government had offered
many proposals for compromise on the National Assembly and the RPF had
not offered anything other than its original idea of a
nominated
assembly.
He also remarked with some asperity that h~ was not in
position to determine who would lead the Gvoernment's delegation the next
round and claLmed ignorance of any offer by Habyr~ana to meet with
Kanyarengwe. He hoped the meetings tomorrow would prove fruitful.
The
plenary
adjourned with words of encouragement from Ambassador Fall
especially to reach agreement on modalities and timing of portfolio
allocations on which the parties seemed so close to agreement.

Wednesday, October 28
facilitator Mpungwe told me mid-day that the Tanzanian Ambassador to
Kigali had met with President Habyar~ana. the president said he could
not accede to RPF demands on the National Assembly.
thecouncil of
Ministers was deadlocked. He bel~eved that the negotiations should have
a recess.
The Pr~e Minister on the other hand wanted a protocol signed
and told the Fomin to work out any arrangement he could.
the President
thought it was not fair to burden one man with such responsibility. The
Rwandan needed to work out a common solution to this.
Mpungwe had
checked with both sides and they ag~eed to initial what they had already
negotiated as soon as documents could be prepared.
The parties were
however still meeting to discuss issues. Thomas Kalisa told Rawson they
were still hoping for some "surprises" at plenary that evening.
At the Plenary, however, the Minister simply explained that the two
parties intended to sign a for.mal protocol on Power Sharing--Part I.
Negotiations would resume in 15 days dealing with refugees issues,
formation of the interim government and nature and functions of the
interim National Assembly.
Bizimungu spoke at length about the kind of
issues involved in the refugee question.
There were numerous inquiries
from observers regarding the time-table and whether neighboring states
and refugee organizations: could be prepared in two weeks to address
refugee issues.
The Fomin suggested an alternate schedule in which
formation of government and National Assembly would be dealt
then
military integration opened during two week's discussions followed by
another pause before concluding work on the military and treating refugee
issues.
Bizimungu
expressed
the hope that negotiations could be
completed in time to give the Rwandan people a Christmas present of
peace.
Thursday, October 29
The day was spent in preparing the draft protocol and communique. in
the evening Amb. Mpungwe wanted to talk about alternatives for the
National Assembly.
Rawson pointed out that an elective process would
have by constitutionally moving the CND aside would have avoided the
political dilemmas that have stalled current negotiations. Further, in
our view, processes of conflict resolution should move quickly through to
elections so as to break political deadlock and remove ambiguities of
mandate. Mpungwe made all the standard arguments why elections would be
counter productive in the Rwandan situation. Ugandan High Commissioner
to Tanzania supported his arguments.
Rawson argued that the important
thing was to listen to all sides and try to understand why Habyrimana has
problems with an appointed legislature.
We were negotiating in
a
political marketplace and shouldtry to arange a deal that did not exclude
anyone or leave somethinking they had been had by the process.
It seems
apparent that Impungwe will push for a new totally nominated legislature
when his President sees Ruhigira. Rawson urged that someway be devised
to keep key members of the CND in the political process and hence
committed to the peace accord.
in conversations with Fomin Diria, Rawson found him favoring the
government position against early distribution of portfolios but against
an electoral process that could challenge and upset
the
delicate
power-sharing balance which was being put together in the government. He
had some ideas of a two-level legislative process with a "national
conference" handling legislative issues related to the interim process.
This idea had already been tried out in the government's two-house
proposal and rejected.
Diria may not have beenmade aware of this due to
his
extended
absence
from
the
negotiations.

